

EMPIRICAL INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (ECO 310)

Fall 2022 – Victor Aguirregabiria

SOLUTION TO PROBLEM SET 2

November 20, 2022

INSTRUCTIONS. Please, follow these instructions for the submission of your completed problem set.

1. Write your answers electronically in a word processor.
2. For the answers that involve coding in STATA, include in the document the code in STATA that you have used to obtain your empirical results.
3. Convert the document to PDF format.
4. Submit your problem set in PDF online via Quercus.
5. You should submit your completed problem set by **Sunday, November 20, 11:59pm**.
6. You can discuss about the problem set with you classmates, but your answers and code should be written individually.

The total number of marks is 200.

To answer the Questions in this Problem Set, you need to use the datafile `datafile_problemset_02_2022.dta` that you can download from the course website in Quercus. Use this dataset to implement the estimations described below. Please, provide the STATA code that you use to obtain the results.

This dataset contains information on the retail wine industry in a Canadian province. It is a panel dataset with three dimensions: wine product, retail store, and month. It includes 11,033 wine products, 623 stores, and 12 months, and a total of 6,180,915 product-store-month observations.

The following Table provides a brief description of all the variables in this dataset.

Description of datafile	
datafile_problemset_02_2022.dta	
Variable name	Description
<i>product</i>	Wine Product ID Number
<i>store</i>	Store ID Number
<i>period</i>	Month count: from 1 to 12
<i>qunit</i>	Quantity (750ml bottles) sold of product in store and month
<i>price_750ml</i>	Price of Product per 750ml bottle
<i>alc</i>	Alcohol percentage points of Wine Product
<i>sugar_gpl</i>	Sugar (gram per litter) of Wine Product
<i>redwine</i>	Dummy for Red Wine
<i>whitewine</i>	Dummy for White Wine
<i>num_country</i>	Country of origin of Wine Product
<i>ontario</i>	Dummy for Ontario origin of Wine Product
<i>winerack</i>	Dummy for Wine Product belongs Wine Rack Brand
<i>wineshop</i>	Dummy for Wine Product belongs Wine Shop Brand
<i>otherontario</i>	Dummy for Ontario Wine other than Wine Rack or Wine Shop
<i>local_msize</i>	Market size (in bottles of wine) at store-month

For the rest of this problem set, we use the following subindexes: j for product, m for store (local market), and t for month.

Consider the following Logit Demand Model:

$$\ln \left(\frac{s_{jmt}}{s_{0mt}} \right) = -\alpha p_{jt} + \mathbf{x}_j \boldsymbol{\beta} + \xi_{jmt} \quad (1)$$

Variable s_{jmt} is the market share of product j in store m and month t , that is, $s_{jmt} = \frac{q_{unit}}{localmsize}$. Variable p_{jt} represents the price of product j at month t , that is, $p_{jt} = price_{750ml}$. Note that, in this province, the price of a product is the same across all the local markets (stores). Finally, vector \mathbf{x}_j contains the following product characteristics:


$\mathbf{x}_j = (alc, sugargpl, redwine, whitewine, winerack, wineshop, otherontario, \text{Country dummies})$

QUESTION 1. [20 points]. (A) Construct market shares s_{jmt} and s_{0mt} , and variable $y_{jmt} = \ln(s_{jmt}/s_{0mt})$. (B) Present a figure with the histogram of y .

ANSWER: These are the lines of code in STATA.

```
gen share = qunit/local_msize
egen sumshare = sum(share), by(store period)
gen share0 = 1 - sumshare
gen y = ln(share)-ln(share0)
hist y
```

This is the figure with the histogram of y .



QUESTION 2. [20 points]. Obtain the OLS estimates of parameters α and β in equation (1). In this regression, include store fixed effects and month fixed effects. When reporting your table of estimation results, please do not include estimated coefficients for store dummies and month dummies.

ANSWER: These are the lines of code in STATA.

```
reghdfe y price_750ml alc sugar_gpl redwine whitewine winerack wineshop otherontario
i.num_country, a(store period)
gen alpha_q2 = -_b[price_750ml]
```

This is the table of estimation results.

```
. reghdfe y price_750ml alc sugar_gpl redwine whitewine winerack wineshop otherontario i.num_country, a(store period)
(MWFE estimator converged in 4 iterations)
```

HDFE Linear regression	Number of obs	=	5,234,233
Absorbing 2 HDFE groups	F(39,5233560)	=	39136.46
	Prob > F	=	0.0000
	R-squared	=	0.4251
	Adj R-squared	=	0.4250
	Within R-sq.	=	0.2258
	Root MSE	=	1.1166

y	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	
price_750ml	-.0400237	.0000443	-904.15	0.000	-.0401104	-.0399369
alc	-.0718711	.0002776	-258.91	0.000	-.0724152	-.0713271
sugar_gpl	.0018357	.000021	87.41	0.000	.0017946	.0018769
redwine	.2939236	.0019097	153.91	0.000	.2901807	.2976665
whitewine	.2419486	.0019394	124.76	0.000	.2381475	.2457497
winerack	.0059154	.0034163	1.73	0.083	-.0007804	.0126112
wineshop	.0889334	.0035737	24.89	0.000	.0819291	.0959377
otherontario	-.8095651	.0031035	-260.85	0.000	-.8156478	-.8034823
num_country						
Australia	-.0493464	.0029291	-16.85	0.000	-.0550874	-.0436054
Austria	-1.663765	.0154882	-107.42	0.000	-1.694122	-1.633409
Bulgaria	-.5142011	.0243035	-21.16	0.000	-.5618351	-.466567
Canada	.0435827	.0037798	11.53	0.000	.0361745	.0509909
Chile	-.0138141	.0032518	-4.25	0.000	-.0201875	-.0074407
France	-.2946378	.0029452	-100.04	0.000	-.3004103	-.2888653
Georgia	-1.088462	.0398413	-27.32	0.000	-1.16655	-1.010375
Germany	-.2864667	.0045466	-63.01	0.000	-.2953779	-.2775556
Greece	-.8517643	.0087705	-97.12	0.000	-.8689542	-.8345743
Hungary	-.4024938	.0091775	-43.86	0.000	-.4204814	-.3845061
Israel	-.9708158	.0179022	-54.23	0.000	-1.005903	-.9357282
Italy	-.0251114	.0028027	-8.96	0.000	-.0306045	-.0196182
Jamaica	-.7160749	.0287141	-24.94	0.000	-.7723536	-.6597963
Japan	-.8304819	.0094734	-87.66	0.000	-.8490494	-.8119145
Lebanon	-1.922526	.0761997	-25.23	0.000	-2.071875	-1.773177
Luxembourg	-.7329813	.0714058	-10.27	0.000	-.8729343	-.5930284
Mexico	-.5580269	.0245101	-22.77	0.000	-.6060659	-.5099879
Montenegro	-.8259244	.0333839	-24.74	0.000	-.8913557	-.7604932
New Zealand	-.2916938	.0044912	-64.95	0.000	-.3004963	-.2828912
Poland	-.5890749	.0270352	-21.79	0.000	-.642063	-.5360868
Portugal	-.3176446	.004158	-76.39	0.000	-.3257941	-.309495
Republic of Macedonia	-.8692797	.0325435	-26.71	0.000	-.9330638	-.8054956
Romania	-.4582615	.0243662	-18.81	0.000	-.5060183	-.4105047
Serbia	-.4705951	.0163173	-28.84	0.000	-.5025765	-.4386137
South Africa	-.1961989	.0038493	-50.97	0.000	-.2037435	-.1886543
South Korea	-1.204587	.0321621	-37.45	0.000	-1.267623	-1.14155
Spain	-.4254888	.0038105	-111.66	0.000	-.4329572	-.4180205
Switzerland	-1.501503	.1183965	-12.68	0.000	-1.733556	-1.26945
USA	-.0059063	.0029572	-2.00	0.046	-.0117023	-.0001103
Ukraine	-1.00718	.0794732	-12.67	0.000	-1.162945	-.8514152
United Kingdom	-.2732882	.0320088	-8.54	0.000	-.3360242	-.2105521
_cons	-6.193492	.0045431	-1363.27	0.000	-6.202396	-6.184588

QUESTION 3. [20 points]. Based on your estimates in Question 2, provide an estimate of the willingness to pay (in dollars per 750ml bottle) of the average consumer for the following changes.

ANSWER: Let me start providing a general description of the calculation of a consumer maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for switching from a product with characteristics \mathbf{x}_j to other product with characteristics \mathbf{x}_k . The WTP is equal to the change in price that leaves the consumer indifferent (same utility) between buying product j and product k . That is, the equation that defines the WTP is:

$$\mathbf{x}_j \boldsymbol{\beta} - \alpha p_j = \mathbf{x}_k \boldsymbol{\beta} - \alpha (p_j + WTP)$$

Solving for WTP, we have:

$$WTP = \frac{(\mathbf{x}_k - \mathbf{x}_j) \boldsymbol{\beta}}{\alpha}$$

For instance, if the only difference between \mathbf{x}_k and \mathbf{x}_j is that k is red wine and j is white wine, we have:

$$WTP = \frac{\beta_{redwine} - \beta_{whitewine}}{\alpha}$$

- a. A reduction in alcohol content of 1 percent point.

ANSWER: This is equal to $\frac{-\beta_{alc}}{\alpha}$. Note that it is a REDUCTION in alcohol content, and this is why the negative sign multiplying β_{alc} . Note also that $\alpha = -b[price]$. The line of code in STATA is:

```
dis (-_b[alc])/(-_b[price])
```

And the result is:

```
1.7957159
```

The average consumer is willing to pay \$1.79 more per bottle if the alcohol content is reduced in 1 percent point.

- b. An increase in sugar content of 1 gram per liter.

ANSWER: This is equal to $\frac{\beta_{sugar_gpl}}{\alpha}$. The line of code in STATA is:

```
dis _b[sugar_gpl]/(-_b[price])
```

And the result is:

0.04586609

The average consumer is willing to pay only 4 cents more per bottle if the sugar content increases in 1 gram per liter.

c. Switching from a white wine to a red wine.

ANSWER: This is equal to $\frac{\beta_{redwine} - \beta_{whitewine}}{\alpha}$. The line of code in STATA is:

```
dis (_b[redwine]-_b[whitewine])/(-_b[price])
```

And the result is:

1.2986066

The average consumer is willing to pay \$1.29 more for a bottle of red wine than for a bottle of white wine.

d. Switching from "otherontario" wine to "wineshop" wine.

ANSWER: This is equal to $\frac{\beta_{wineshop} - \beta_{otherontario}}{\alpha}$. The line of code in STATA is:

```
dis (_b[wineshop]-_b[otherontario])/(-_b[price])
```

And the result is:

22.449176

The average consumer is willing to pay \$22.44 more for a bottle of Wineshop wine than for a bottle of otherontario wine. The average consumer perceives a very large difference in quality between Ontario wines of the WineShop brand and Ontario wines that do not belong to WineShop or WineRack brands (otherontario).

e. Switching from a French wine to a Canadian wine.

ANSWER: This is equal to $\frac{\beta_{Canada} - \beta_{France}}{\alpha}$. To obtain this WTP in STATA, it is important to see that "Canada" corresponds to *num_country* == 6, and "France" corresponds to *num_country* == 9. The line of code in STATA is:

```
dis (_b[6.num_country] - _b[9.num_country]) / (-_b[price])
```

And the result is:

8.4505123

The average consumer is willing to pay \$8.45 more for a bottle of Canadian wine than for a bottle of French wine. It could be interpreted in terms of average quality differences, but also in terms of preference bias towards domestic products.

QUESTION 4. [10 points]. Based on the estimates in Question 2, obtain a variable with the estimated own-price demand elasticity $-\frac{ds_{jmt}}{dp_{jmt}} \frac{p_{jmt}}{s_{jmt}}$ for every observation (j, m, t) in the data. Present the mean and median of this variable, and a figure with its histogram.

ANSWER: For the logit model, the derivative $\frac{ds_{jmt}}{dp_{jmt}}$ is equal to $-\alpha s_{jmt}(1 - s_{jmt})$. Therefore, the own-price demand elasticity $-\frac{ds_{jmt}}{dp_{jmt}} \frac{p_{jmt}}{s_{jmt}}$ is equal to $\alpha p_{jmt}(1 - s_{jmt})$. The lines of code in STATA are:


```
gen elast_q2 = alpha_q2 * (1-share) * price_750ml
sum elast_q2, detail // Summary statistics
hist elast_q2 // Histogram
```

This is the table of Summary Statistics.

```
. sum elast_q2, detail    // Summary statistics
```

elast_q2				
<hr/>				
	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	.2390613	.1561722		
5%	.2630428	.1580908		
10%	.2918696	.1590348	Obs	6,180,915
25%	.3780208	.1605566	Sum of wgt.	6,180,915
50%	.5178548		Mean	.6209684
		Largest	Std. dev.	.5163205
75%	.66789	7.984651		
90%	.9584959	7.994168	Variance	.2665869
95%	1.402332	8.002663	Skewness	5.020582
99%	3.001732	8.002674	Kurtosis	39.68019

The mean elasticity is 0.62 and the median elasticity is 0,51. This is the Histogram of estimates elasticities.



QUESTION 5. [20 points]. Suppose that ξ_{jmt} follows an AR(1) process: $\xi_{jmt} = \rho \xi_{jm,t-1} + a_{jmt}$. Obtain the OLS Cochrane-Orcutt estimates of parameters ρ , α , $\rho\alpha$, and $(1 - \rho)\beta$. In this regression, include store fixed effects and month fixed effects. Do not report coefficients for store dummies and month dummies.

ANSWER: The Cochrane-Orcutt transformation of the model is a "Quasi-first-difference": we multiply the equation at period $t - 1$ times ρ and subtract this equation to the equation at period t . We obtain the following regression equation:

$$y_{jmt} = \gamma_1 y_{jm,t-1} + \gamma_2 p_{jmt} + \gamma_3 p_{jm,t-1} + \mathbf{x}_j \gamma_4 + a_{jmt}$$

where $\gamma_1 = \rho$, $\gamma_2 = -\alpha$, $\gamma_3 = \rho\alpha$, and $\gamma_4 = (1 - \rho)\beta$. We apply OLS with Fixed Effects to this regression equation. These are the lines of Code in STATA.

```
// Construction of lagged y
sort product store period
gen y_1 = y[_n-1] if (product==product[_n-1]) (store==store[_n-1])

// Construction of lagged price
gen price_1 = price[_n-1] if (product==product[_n-1]) (store==store[_n-1])

// OLS - Cochrane-Orcutt regression
reghdfe y y_1 price_750ml price_1 alc sugar_gpl redwine whitewine winerack wineshop
otherontario i.num_country, a(store period)

gen alpha_q5 = -_b[price_750ml]
```

This is the Table with the Cochrane-Orcutt FE estimates.

```
. reghdfe y y_1 price_750ml price_1 alc sugar_gpl redwine whitewine winerack wineshop otherontario i.num_country, a(store period)
(MWFE estimator converged in 4 iterations)
```

HDFE Linear regression	Number of obs	=	4,524,065
Absorbing 2 HDFE groups	F(41,4523391)	=	194654.85
	Prob > F	=	0.0000
	R-squared	=	0.7314
	Adj R-squared	=	0.7314
	Within R-sq.	=	0.6383
	Root MSE	=	0.7553

y	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P> t	[95% conf. interval]	
y_1	.7328674	.0003234	2266.08	0.000	.7322335	.7335012
price_750ml	-.2354997	.0005655	-416.45	0.000	-.236608	-.2343913
price_1	.2244183	.0005674	395.51	0.000	.2233062	.2255304
alc	-.0191792	.0002017	-95.08	0.000	-.0195746	-.0187838
sugar_gpl	.0004285	.0000154	27.85	0.000	.0003983	.0004586
redwine	.0626643	.001406	44.57	0.000	.0599085	.0654201
whitewine	.0633322	.001427	44.38	0.000	.0605353	.0661291
winerack	.0128959	.0024634	5.23	0.000	.0080677	.0177242
wineshop	.0293741	.0025705	11.43	0.000	.0243361	.0344122
otherontario	-.214636	.0022605	-94.95	0.000	-.2190666	-.2102055
num_country						
Australia	-.0258695	.0021431	-12.07	0.000	-.0300699	-.0216692
Austria	-.468588	.0117506	-39.88	0.000	-.4916188	-.4455572
Bulgaria	-.1408248	.0173303	-8.13	0.000	-.1747916	-.1068581
Canada	-.0047509	.0027476	-1.73	0.084	-.0101361	.0006344
Chile	-.009832	.00237	-4.15	0.000	-.0144772	-.0051869
France	-.0891188	.0021644	-41.17	0.000	-.093361	-.0848766
Georgia	-.3444855	.0362721	-9.50	0.000	-.4155775	-.2733935
Germany	-.0884129	.0032878	-26.89	0.000	-.0948569	-.0819689
Greece	-.2353675	.0065117	-36.15	0.000	-.2481303	-.2226047
Hungary	-.1111851	.0066636	-16.69	0.000	-.1242455	-.0981247
Israel	-.1852285	.0139085	-13.32	0.000	-.2124886	-.1579683
Italy	-.0098927	.0020529	-4.82	0.000	-.0139163	-.0058692
Jamaica	-.2098928	.0205262	-10.23	0.000	-.2501234	-.1696621
Japan	-.2330154	.0068837	-33.85	0.000	-.2465072	-.2195236
Lebanon	-.4351287	.0727157	-5.98	0.000	-.5776489	-.2926086
Luxembourg	-.2092075	.0619266	-3.38	0.001	-.3305814	-.0878337
Mexico	-.2236182	.0189948	-11.77	0.000	-.2608473	-.186389
Montenegro	-.2488628	.0238747	-10.42	0.000	-.2956563	-.2020693
New Zealand	-.0738408	.0033309	-22.17	0.000	-.0803693	-.0673123
Poland	-.1746559	.0193909	-9.01	0.000	-.2126613	-.1366506
Portugal	-.0875834	.0030301	-28.90	0.000	-.0935223	-.0816445
Republic of Macedonia	-.227967	.0232284	-9.81	0.000	-.2734939	-.18244
Romania	-.1661927	.0182541	-9.10	0.000	-.20197	-.1304153
Serbia	-.1395491	.0116603	-11.97	0.000	-.1624028	-.1166953
South Africa	-.0488728	.002813	-17.37	0.000	-.0543862	-.0433594
South Korea	-.3392482	.0236212	-14.36	0.000	-.3855449	-.2929515
Spain	-.1269013	.0028143	-45.09	0.000	-.1324173	-.1213853
Switzerland	-.5430372	.1315132	-4.13	0.000	-.8007983	-.2852761
USA	-.0016444	.002173	-0.76	0.449	-.0059033	.0026146
Ukraine	-.4844619	.0720937	-6.72	0.000	-.6257631	-.3431607
United Kingdom	-.0981158	.0229296	-4.28	0.000	-.143057	-.0531745
_cons	-1.626884	.0038495	-422.62	0.000	-1.634429	-1.619339

COMMENTS ON Cochrane-Orcutt FE estimates.

- $\rho = \text{corr}[y_1] = 0.7328$. There is substantial serial correlation in the demand unobservables ξ_{jmt} .
- $\alpha = -\text{b}[price_750ml] = 0.2354$. This estimate of the price coefficient is six times larger than the OLS-FE in Question 2 (0.040). This is consistent with strong simultaneity bias in the OLS-FE in Question 2 due to correlation between p_{jmt} and ξ_{jmt} , and more specifically, due to correlation between p_{jmt} and $\rho \xi_{jmt,t-1}$. By including $y_{jmt,t-1}$ and $p_{jmt,t-1}$ as regressors, the Cochrane-Orcutt FE estimator is controlling for $\rho \xi_{jmt,t-1}$, and therefore, it does not suffer of bias because correlation between p_{jmt} and $\rho \xi_{jmt,t-1}$. The Cochrane-Orcutt FE estimator can be still biased because correlation between p_{jmt} and a_{jmt} , but this source of bias is also present in the OLS-FE estimator in Question 2. There is a solid argument for Cochrane-Orcutt FE estimator to be substantially less biased than OLS-FE.
- Cochrane-Orcutt model implies the over-identifying restriction: $\gamma_1\gamma_2 + \gamma_3 = 0$. The estimate of $\gamma_1\gamma_2 + \gamma_3$ (`display _b[y_1]*_b[price_750ml] +_b[price_1]`) is equal to 0.0518, which is "close to zero", given the magnitude of the parameter estimates. However, with this large sample, parameter estimates are very precise, and the test of this over-identifying restriction (`testnl _b[y_1]*_b[price_750ml] +_b[price_1] = 0`) clearly rejects it, with a p-value smaller than 0.01%.
- To compare the estimates in Questions 2 and 5 of parameters for product characteristics other than price (the variable in vector x_j). we need to take into account that $\gamma = (1 - \rho)\beta$. For instance, in Question 5, $\gamma_{alc} = -0.0191$, that implies $\beta_{alc} = \gamma_{alc}/(1 - \rho) = -0.0191/(1 - 0.7328) = -0.07179$. This is almost identical to the estimate of β_{alc} in Question 2 which is -0.07187 .

QUESTION 6. [10 points]. Based on the estimates in Question 5, obtain a variable with the estimated own-price demand elasticity $-\frac{ds_{jmt}}{dp_{jmt}} \frac{p_{jmt}}{s_{jmt}}$ for every observation (j, m, t) in the data. Present the mean and median of this variable, and a figure with its histogram.

ANSWER: For the logit model, the derivative $\frac{ds_{jmt}}{dp_{jmt}}$ is equal to $-\alpha s_{jmt}(1 - s_{jmt})$. Therefore, the own-price demand elasticity $-\frac{ds_{jmt}}{dp_{jmt}} \frac{p_{jmt}}{s_{jmt}}$ is equal to $\alpha p_{jmt}(1 - s_{jmt})$. The lines of code in STATA are:

```
gen elast_q5 = alpha_q5 * (1-share) * price_750ml
sum elast_q5, detail // Summary statistics
hist elast_q5 // Histogram
```


This is the table of Summary Statistics.

```
. sum elast_q5, detail // Summary statistics
```

elast_q5				
<hr/>				
	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	1.406639	.9189186		
5%	1.547747	.930208		
10%	1.717363	.9357624	Obs	6,180,915
25%	2.224278	.9447165	Sum of wgt.	6,180,915
50%	3.047062		Mean	3.653784
		Largest	Std. dev.	3.038035
75%	3.929871	46.98177		
90%	5.6398	47.03777	Variance	9.229658
95%	8.251336	47.08775	Skewness	5.020582
99%	17.66222	47.08782	Kurtosis	39.68019

Now, the mean elasticity is 3.65 and the median elasticity is 3.04. These elasticities are around six times the ones in Question 4.

This is the histogram of elasticities.



QUESTION 7. [10 points]. Taking into account potential endogeneity, interpret the different estimates of α and of the corresponding demand elasticities in Questions 2 and 5. Based on this interpretation, select between one of these two demand estimations. Justify your choice.

ANSWER:

The CO-FE estimates of α and of price elasticities in Question 5 are six times larger the OLS-FE estimates in Question 2. This is consistent with strong simultaneity bias in the OLS-FE in Question 2 due to correlation between p_{jmt} and ξ_{jmt} , and more specifically, due to correlation between p_{jmt} and $\rho \xi_{jm,t-1}$. By including $y_{jm,t-1}$ and $p_{jm,t-1}$ as regressors, the Cochrane-Orcutt FE estimator is controlling for $\rho \xi_{jm,t-1}$, and therefore, it does not suffer of bias because correlation between p_{jmt} and $\rho \xi_{jm,t-1}$. The Cochrane-Orcutt FE estimator can be still biased because correlation between p_{jmt} and a_{jmt} , but this source of bias is also present in the OLS-FE estimator in Question 2. There is a solid argument for Cochrane-Orcutt FE estimator to be substantially less biased than OLS-FE. Between these two estimators, I would choose CO-FE.

For the remaining questions, we consider the following assumptions.

- A. Each wine product is produced by a single manufacturer, and that each manufacturer produces only one wine product. Therefore, j indexes both products and firms.

- B. Firms (i.e., wine manufacturers) compete in prices a la Nash-Bertrand.
- C. Each store m is a separate geographic market where firms (i.e., wine manufacturers) compete with each other.
- D. Every firm can choose a different for its wine product at each store.
- E. The marginal cost of product j in market m at month t , MC_{jmt} , is constant: that is, MC_{jmt} does not depend on the amount of output q_{jmt} .

QUESTION 8. [10 points].

- a. Obtain the expression for the first order condition of profit maximization for firm j in market m at month t .

ANSWER: Under conditions A to E, the profit of firm j in store m at period t is:

$$\pi_{jmt} = H_{mt} (p_{jmt} - MC_{jmt}) s_{jmt}$$

where H_{mt} represent market size (number of consumers) in m at period t . Under Nash-Bertrand competition, the first order condition for profit maximization is:

$$\frac{d\pi_{jmt}}{dp_{jmt}} = H_{mt} s_{jmt} + H_{mt} (p_{jmt} - MC_{jmt}) \frac{ds_{jmt}}{dp_{jmt}} = 0$$

For the logit demand model, $\frac{ds_{jmt}}{dp_{jmt}} = -\alpha s_{jmt}(1 - s_{jmt})$. Plugging this expression into the equation for the marginal condition for profit maximization, we get:

$$H_{mt} s_{jmt} - H_{mt} (p_{jmt} - MC_{jmt}) \alpha s_{jmt} (1 - s_{jmt}) = 0$$

- b Based on this condition, obtain a "pricing equation" for price p_{jmt} in terms of MC_{jmt} and a price-cost margin term that depends only on α and s_{jmt} .

ANSWER: In the F.O.C. for profit maximization, we have divide both sides of the equation by $H_{mt} s_{jmt}$ to obtain:

$$1 - (p_{jmt} - MC_{jmt}) \alpha (1 - s_{jmt}) = 0$$

Solving for p_{jmt} , we get the pricing equation:

$$p_{jmt} = MC_{jmt} + \frac{1}{\alpha (1 - s_{jmt})}$$

The term $\frac{1}{\alpha (1 - s_{jmt})}$ represents the Price-Cost Margin in dollars.

- c. Define the price-cost margin PCM_{jmt} as $\frac{p_{jmt} - MC_{jmt}}{p_{jmt}}$. Obtain an expression for the price-cost margin in terms only of α , s_{jmt} , and p_{jmt} .

ANSWER: $PCM_{jmt} \equiv \frac{p_{jmt} - MC_{jmt}}{p_{jmt}}$ is the Price-Cost Margin as a percentage of the price. It is also denoted the *Lerner Index*. Using the pricing equation in Question 8(b), we have that:

$$PCM_{jmt} \equiv \frac{p_{jmt} - MC_{jmt}}{p_{jmt}} = \frac{1}{\alpha p_{jmt} (1 - s_{jmt})}$$

QUESTION 9. [20 points]. Use the expressions in Question 8 to obtain estimates of MC_{jmt} and of PCM_{jmt} for every observation (j, m, t) . Use your favorite estimate of α . Obtain the mean and median of PCM . Present a histogram of the estimated $PCMs$.

ANSWER: These are the lines of code in STATA:


```
gen MCest = price_750ml - 1/(alpha_q5 * (1-share))
gen PCMest = (price_750ml - MCest)/price_750ml
sum PCMest, detail
hist PCMest
```

This is the table of summary statistics for PCMest:

```
. sum PCMest, detail
```

PCMest				
<hr/>				
	Percentiles	Smallest		
1%	.056618	.0212369		
5%	.1211925	.0212369		
10%	.1773113	.0212595	Obs	6,180,915
25%	.2544613	.0212848	Sum of wgt.	6,180,915
50%	.328185		Mean	.3588846
		Largest	Std. dev.	.1512186
75%	.4495841	1.058519		
90%	.5822879	1.068647	Variance	.0228671
95%	.6461005	1.075028	Skewness	.3753284
99%	.7109144	1.088236	Kurtosis	2.682985

The mean PCM is 35.8%, and the median is 32.8%. This is the Histogram of PCMs:



For Question 10 below, take into account the equation for market share in a demand logit model:

$$s_{jmt} = \frac{a_{jmt} \exp\{-\alpha p_{jmt} + w_{jmt}\}}{1 + \sum_{i=1}^J a_{imt} \exp\{-\alpha p_{imt} + w_{imt}\}} \quad (2)$$

where $a_{jmt} \in \{0, 1\}$ is a binary variable that indicates whether product j is available in store m at month t . i.e., a_{jmt} is the indicator of $q_{jmt} > 0$. Variable w_{jmt} is equal to $\mathbf{x}_j \boldsymbol{\beta} + \xi_{jmt}$, and it can be interpreted as an index of product quality. Also, note that in the logit demand model, taking into account equation (1), we can obtain w_{jmt} using the following equation:

$$w_{jmt} = \ln\left(\frac{s_{jmt}}{s_{0mt}}\right) + \alpha p_{jt} \quad (3)$$

QUESTION 10. [60 points]. Given your estimates of demand parameters and MCs, we are interested in evaluating the effects on quantities, prices, firms' profits, and consumer welfare of a hypothetical (counterfactual) increase in the tax of alcohol. Suppose that the tax increase is equal to 1 cent of a dollar per percentage of alcohol in the product, i.e., $\text{taxchange}_j = \$0.01 * alc_j$.

- [5 points]** Calculate new variable taxchange with taxchange_{jmt} for every observation (j, m, t) . Add taxchange to the estimated marginal cost to obtain the new (counterfactual) marginal cost for every observation (j, m, t) .

ANSWER: These are the lines of code in StATA.

```
// Calculate taxchange
gen taxchange = 0.01 * alc

// Calculate New Marginal Cost
gen newMC = MCest + taxchange
```

- b. **[5 points]** Using equation (3), calculate a new variable wquality with w_{jmt} for every observation (j, m, t) .

ANSWER: This is the line of code in StATA.

```
gen wquality = y + alpha_q5 * price_750ml
```

- c. **[20 points]** Obtain an approximation to the new (counterfactual) equilibrium prices and market shares using the following iterative procedure.

- Step 1. Use the pricing equation in Question 8(b) to obtain new prices, say $p_{jmt}^{ITER 1}$, using the new MCs, your estimate of α , and s_{jmt} in the data.
- Step 2. Use equation (2) for market shares, your estimates for product qualities w_{jmt} , and new prices $p_{jmt}^{ITER 1}$ to calculate new market shares, say $s_{jmt}^{ITER 1}$.
- Step 3. Similar as Step 1 but using market shares $s_{jmt}^{ITER 1}$ instead of the shares in the data. Let $p_{jmt}^{ITER 2}$ be the prices you obtain after applying this iteration.
- Step 4. Similar to Step 2 but using prices $p_{jmt}^{ITER 2}$ instead of $p_{jmt}^{ITER 1}$. Let $s_{jmt}^{ITER 2}$ be the shares you obtain after applying this iteration.

ANSWER: These are the lines of code in STATA.

```
// Step 1
gen p_iter_1 = newMC + 1/(alpha_q5 * (1-share))

// Step 2
gen buff = exp(-alpha_q5 * p_iter_1 + wquality)
egen agg_buff = sum(buff), by(store period)
gen s_iter_1 = buff/(1 + agg_buff)
```

```
drop buff agg_buff
```

```
// Step 3
```

```
gen p_iter_2 = newMC + 1/(alpha_q5 * (1-s_iter_1))
```

```
// Step 4
```

```
gen buff = exp(-alpha_q5 * p_iter_2 + wquality)
```

```
egen agg_buff = sum(buff), by(store period)
```

```
gen s_iter_2 = buff/(1 + agg_buff)
```

```
drop buff agg_buff
```

- d. [30 points] Suppose that $p_{jmt}^{ITER 2}$ and $s_{jmt}^{ITER 2}$ are prices and market shares after the implementation of this counterfactual tax change. Calculate the following statistics at the aggregate annual and province level:

– **Median price change.**

ANSWER: These are the lines of code in STATA.

```
// d. Median Price Change
```

```
gen price_change = p_iter_2 - price_750ml
```

```
sum price_change, detail
```

This is the table of summary statistics:

```
. sum price_change, detail
```

price_change				
Percentiles		Smallest		
1%	.0600023	.0480013		
5%	.0949984	.0498319		
10%	.1119576	.0499992	Obs	6,180,915
25%	.1199932	.0499992	Sum of wgt.	6,180,915
			Mean	.1275753
			Std. dev.	.0185573
50%	.129981	Largest		
75%	.1349945	.4699974		
90%	.1399879	.4699974	Variance	.0003444
95%	.1449966	.4699974	Skewness	.5621972
99%	.1997428	.4699974	Kurtosis	23.46936

The median price change is 0.13

COMMENTS: The median of taxchange is 0.13 and the median price change is 0.13. Therefore, at the median there is a complete pass-through of the tax to prices "as if" there were a perfectly competitive market. However, this is not the case over the whole distribution of prices.

– Change in annual sales of wine in this province.

ANSWER: These are the lines of code in STATA.

```
// d. Change in annual sales of wine in this province
gen change_q = (s_iter_2 - share) * local_msize
egen agg_change_q = sum(change_q)
sum agg_change_q
```

This is the table of summary statistics:

```
. sum agg_change_q
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
agg_change_q	6,180,915	-2344767	0	-2344767	-2344767

The change in annual sales of wine is of 2,344,767 bottle of wine. The annual sales before the tax was 161 million bottles, so this change represents a reduction of 1.4%.

– Government annual revenue from this tax increase.

ANSWER: These are the lines of code in STATA.

```
// d. Government annual revenue from this tax increase.
gen gov_revenue = taxchange * s_iter_2 * local_msize
egen agg_gov_revenue = sum(gov_revenue)
sum agg_gov_revenue
```

This the table of summary statistics:

```
. sum agg_gov_revenue
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
agg_gov_reve	6,180,915	1.96e+07	0	1.96e+07	1.96e+07

The Government annual revenue from this tax increase is \$19.6 million.

– Change in total annual firms’ profits in this province.

ANSWER: These are the lines of code in STATA.

```
// d. Change in total annual firms’ profits in this province.
gen profit_data = (price_750ml - MCest)* share * local_msize
gen profit_tax = (p_iter_2 - newMC)* s_iter_2 * local_msize
gen change_profit = profit_tax - profit_data
sum agg_change_profit
```

This the table of summary statistics:

```
. sum agg_change_profit
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
agg_change~t	6,180,915	-9995187	0	-9995187	-9995187

The change in total annual firms' profits is \$10 million. This is almost half of the increase in government revenue. So, half of the government revenue is at the expense of firms profits.

– Change in annual Consumer Surplus in this province.

ANSWER: These are the lines of code in STATA.

```
// d. Change in annual Consumer Surplus in this province
gen change_csurplus = - price_change * s_iter_2 * local_msize + 0.5 *
price_change * change_q
egen agg_change_csurplus = sum(change_csurplus)
sum agg_change_csurplus
```

This the table of summary statistics:

```
. sum agg_change_csurplus
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
agg_change~s	6,180,915	-1.98e+07	0	-1.98e+07	-1.98e+07

The change in in annual Consumer Surplus is \$19.8 million. The reduction of consumer surplus is dramatic and it is even larger than the increase in government revenue.

COMMENTS:

- **Annual Deadweight Loss of this tax: Change in consumer surplus + Change in firms' profits + Change in government revenue.**

ANSWER: These are the lines of code in STATA.

```
// d. Annual Deadweight Loss of this tax
// Change in consumer surplus + Change in firms' profits + Change in
government revenue
gen DWL = change_csurplus + change_profit + gov_revenue
egen agg_DWL = sum(DWL)
sum agg_DWL
```

This the table of summary statistics:

```
. sum agg_DWL
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
agg_DWL	6,180,915	-1.01e+07	0	-1.01e+07	-1.01e+07

The DWL is 0 million, which is almost half of the government revenue. That is, for every dollar of government revenue there is 50 cents of net loss in social welfare.

Hint to obtain the change in Consumer Surplus. You can approximate the change in consumer surplus applying the following formula for each observation (j, m, t) . Let (p^{data}, q^{data}) be price and quantity in the data, and let (p^{tax}, q^{tax}) be price and quantity after the tax. Define the change in price as $\Delta p \equiv p^{tax} - p^{data}$, and the change in quantity as $\Delta q \equiv q^{tax} - q^{data}$. Then, the change in consumer surplus can be obtained using the following triangular approximation:

$$\Delta CS \equiv CS^{tax} - CS^{data} = -\Delta p q^{tax} + \frac{1}{2} \Delta p \Delta q \quad (4)$$