ECO 2901 EMPIRICAL INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION Lecture 9: Uncertainty and Firms' Investment Decisions

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Lecture 9: Uncertainty and Firms' Investment Decisions

• There is a **voluminous theoretical literature** on the impact of irreversibility (adjustment costs) and uncertainty on firm investment decisions.

Kydland and Prescott (1982); Abel (1983); Caballero (1991); Pindyck (1991, 1993); Dixit (1992); Abel and Eberly (1994); ...

• However, there is still very little micro-level empirical work using structural models to evaluate the effects of irreversibility and uncertainty on firms' investment and competition.

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Uncertainty and Firms' Investment Decisions

In this lecture, we will study two recent papers on this topic.

- 1. Collard-Wexler (ECMA, 2013): Demand Fluctuations in the Ready-Mix Concrete Industry
- Kalouptsidi (AER, 2014): Time to Build and Fluctuations in Bulk Shipping

1. Demand Fluctuations in the Ready-Mix Concrete Industry

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Collard-Wexler (2013) - Outline

- 1. Motivation
- 2. Some features of the concrete industry
- 3 Data
- 4. Model
- 5. Estimation
- 6. Counterfactuals

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Motivation

- How does demand uncertainty affect firms' investments, market structure, and welfare in an industry?
- In industries with substantial sunk costs in entry or investment decisions, uncertainty can generate substantial inaction and amplification of shocks.
- Because these non-linear costs, uncertainty can affect differently small and large firms, and therefore affect market structure, competition, and welfare.

Ready-Mix Concrete Industry

- Collard-Wexler studies this issue in the US concrete industry during **1976-1999**.
- Substantial demand uncertainty due to volatility of local construction industries.
- Substantial sunk costs and irreversibility in entry and investment decisions.
- Due to high transportation costs, competition is very local: oligopoly industries.

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Location of Concrete plants: Midwest



Number of Concrete Plants in a Zip Code



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Local oligopoly competition

- Homogeneous product.
- Local market: County (approx. 3,100 counties).
- Most counties have fewer than 6 plants

• Market price at the county level declines with the number of plants – though becomes quite flat for plants > 4.

Note: This descriptive evidence likely underestimates the true effect of competition on prices, e.g., more plants in markets with more demand.

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Empirical distribution: number of plants, 1976-1999

TABLE I

MOST COUNTIES IN THE UNITED STATES ARE SERVED BY FEWER THAN SIX READY-MIX CONCRETE PLANTS

Number of Concrete Plants	Number of Counties/Years	Percent	
0	22,502	30%	
1	23,276	31%	
2	12,688	17%	
3	6373	9%	
4	3256	4%	
5	1966	3%	
6	1172	2%	
More than 6	3205	4%	
Total	74,438		

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Median price and number of plants in county



Price and Competition

Demand and uncertainty

- C-W measures (annual) demand using employment in the construction industry at the county level.
- Substantial volatility of demand.
- Approx. 50% of demand for concrete comes from the government: e.g., construction and repairing roads.
- Demand from government is particularly uncertain.

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Sunk Costs of Entry

- Based interviews to managers, the entry cost of a new plant is between **\$3M and \$4M**.
- Land, the Plant itself, and Trucks for distribution to clients.
- **Upon exit**, investments in land and trucks are quite reversible liquid secondary markets with small transaction costs.
- **Upon exit**, investments in the plant itself are almost completely lost just scrap metal.
- Sunk costs are substantial.

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- From the **Longitudinal Business Database (LBD)** of the US Census Bureau: 1976-1999 (24 years).
- Information on NAICS industry, geographic location, entry, exit, employment, and salary. But not on sales, materials, or capital.
- Merge with the **Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM)** with information at the plant level on inputs, outputs, and assets.

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- From the **Longitudinal Business Database (LBD)** of the US Census Bureau: 1976-1999 (24 years).
- Information on NAICS industry, geographic location, entry, exit, employment, and salary. But not on sales, materials, or capital.
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Heterogeneity in plant size

- C-W measures plant size using employment (better measured than capital, and available for all plants).
- Average plant (in 1997): 26 workers; \$3.4M in sales.
- Distribution of plant size is very skewed:
 - 1 employee: 5% of plants
 - <= 8 employees: 33% of plants
 - <= 18 employees: 66% of plants
 - > 80 employees: 5% of plants

Model: State and decision variables

- Class of dynamic game of oligopoly competition that we have seen in class. I keep the same notation as in previous classes.
- k_{it} = endogenous state variable that represents firm size:

$$k_{it} \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$$

- 0 =out of the market;
- 1 =active *small*, with less than 8 workers;
- 2 =active *medium*, with 8 to 17 workers;
- 3 =active *large*, with more than 17 workers.

Model: State and decision variables [2]

- $a_{it} = k_{i,t+1}$ = choice of firm size for next period (and implicitly, entry and exit).
- The complete vector of observable / common knowledge state variables is:

$$\mathbf{x}_t = (k_{1t}, k_{2t}, \dots, k_{Nt}, d_t)$$

• d_t = state of demand. Follows a Markov process with transition $F_d(d_{t+1}|d_t)$.

Profit Function

- If $a_{it} = 0$ (inactive): Profit = 0.
- For $a_{it} = a > 0$:

$$\Pi_{it}(\mathbf{a}) = \theta_1(\mathbf{a}) + \theta_2(\mathbf{a}) \ d_t + \theta_3(\mathbf{a}) \ g\left(\sum_{j \neq i} \mathbf{a}_{jt}\right)$$
$$+ \sum_{k=0}^3 \mathbb{1}\{k_{it} = k\} \ \theta_4(\mathbf{a}, k)$$

- $\theta_3(1)$, $\theta_3(2)$, $\theta_3(3)$, capture competition effects.
- $\theta_4(a, k)$ is the cost of switching from size k to size a. When k = 0, these are entry costs.

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• Discount factor β is fixed at 0.95.

• Two-step method, similar to the 2-step PML that we have seen in class but using GMM in the second step [arguments in the paper for using GMM instead of PML are wrong].

• A "pseudo" fixed-effects to deal with county time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Since T = 24 is relatively large, the bias on the estimated market FEs may be small.

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[2]

- To have parameters in dollar amount, C-W uses the information from interview to managers: entry cost to medium size, $\theta(2,0)$, is 2M. Based on this, all parameters are translated into .
- Remember that average annual sales revenue of a plant: \$3.4M.

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[3]

ESTIMATES FOR THE DYNAMIC MODEL OF ENTRY, EXIT, AND INVESTMENT^a

		Coeff.	S.E.*
Fixed Cost	Small	-139	(6)
	Medium	-244	(10)
	Large	-285	(6)
Log Construction	Small	20	(1)
Employment	Medium	35	(2)
1 2	Large	45	(1)
1st Competitor	Small	-48	(4)
	Medium	-58	(5)
	Large	-63	(6)
Log Competitors	Small	-17	(3)
(Above 1)	Medium	-44	(4)
× /	Large	-48	(3)

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Transition Costs			
$Out \rightarrow Small$		-1002	(11)
$Out \rightarrow Medium^{\dagger}$		-2000	(107)
$Out \rightarrow Large$		-1771	(53)
$Small \rightarrow Medium$		-332	(7)
Small, Past Medium → Mediu	ım	-772	(32)
Small, Past Large \rightarrow Medium		-325	(8)
$Small \rightarrow Large$		-1809	(73)
Small, Past Medium \rightarrow Large		-608	(19)
Small, Past Large \rightarrow Large		-343	(16)
Medium → Small		-107	(6)
Medium, Past Large \rightarrow Small		-314	(6)
Medium → Large		101	(14)
Medium, Past Large \rightarrow Large		-43	(7)
Large \rightarrow Small		-254	(7)
Large \rightarrow Medium		-403	(6)
Standard Deviation of Shock		133	
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• **Fixed cost:** \$244,000 for a medium-sized. Increases with size but less than proportionally.

[5]

• Competition effects:

- First competitor reduces profits by \$58,000, for medium plant.
- Doubling number of competitors reduces profits by \$44,000 per year.

• Switching costs.

- Entry costs (\$2M for medium) are very large relative to the annual profit.

- Increasing the size of a plant is also very costly: 1.8M from small to large.

- It is cheaper to enter as a small plant and grow to a large plant in the next period (80% of plants enter as small plants).

- There are also substantial cost of adjusting size down.

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Goodness of fit

MODEL FIT

Moments	I Real Data (1976–1999)		Simula Using 1	II Simulated Data Using Model $\hat{\theta}^{a}$	
Plant-Level Moments					
Share of Small Plants	48%	(1%)	53%	(1%)	
Share of Medium Plants	27%	(0%)	23%	(1%)	
Share of Large Plants	25%	(1%)	24%	(1%)	
Entry Rate	5.8%	(0.0%)	2.9%	(0.2%)	
Exit Rate	5.4%	(0.0%)	2.9%	(0.2%)	
Ramping Up Rate	10%	(0.1%)	10%	(0.3%)	
Ramping Down Rate	9%	(0.1%)	10%	(0.5%)	
Market-Level Moments					
Number of Plants per Market	2.0	(0.2)	2.0	(0.4)	
No Plants in Market	2%	(0%)	4%	(1%)	
Monopoly Market	46%	(1%)	43%	(1%)	
Duopoly	26%	(1%)	29%	(1%)	
More Than 2 Plants	26%	(1%)	24%	(1%)	
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Counterfactuals: Effect of demand uncertainty

• Three experiments that modify the stochastic process of demand, and more precisely, demand uncertainty.

• Experiment 1. 5 Years Smoothing. Demand is constant over 5 years window (at its realized mean value over the 5 years). This reduces demand uncertainty.

• Experiment 2. Constant demand. Extreme version of the counterfactual. Completely eliminates uncertainty.

• Experiment 3. Plants believe demand is constant, though demand follows its true process in the data.

• Experiment 3 help us to distinguish the part of Experiment 2 that comes from beliefs and eliminating uncertainty – versus the change in the realization of demand.

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Counterfactuals: Caveat

• Contrary to what is claimed in this paper, Fixed Cost, Entry Cost, and Exit Cost are not separately identified (see Aguirregabiria & Suzuki, 2014; Kalouptsidi, Scott, & Souza-Rodrigues, 2019, 2020).

• For this reason, as many other papers, the author "normalizes" the Exit Cost to zero.

• This normalization is innocuous for some counterfactuals (e.g., additive change in profit) but not for others.

• In particular, this normalization – if not true – generates inconsistent counterfactuals associated to a change in the transition of the state variables. This is exactly the type of counterfactual in this paper.

• These counterfactuals are correct only under the assumption that the scrap value is actually zero.

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Demand uncertainty & Turnover

DEMAND SMOOTHING, TURNOVER, AND SIZE CHANGING

	Unsmoothed Demand (\hat{D}^{μ})	5 Years of Smoothing	Constant Demand	Firms Believe Demand is Constant
Turnover				
Entry Rate	2.7%	2.2%	2.2%	4.1%
Exit Rate	2.9%	2.0%	2.1%	4.5%
Change in Size Rate	20%	18%	17%	18%
Investment				
Sunk Entry Costs				
per Year (in Million \$)	132	137	107	155
Size Changing Costs				
per Year (in Million \$)	307	496	407	337
Total Plants	3643	5433	4264	3879
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Demand uncertainty & Turnover

- **Turnover:** Eliminating demand volatility has a modest effect on turnover. Most of turnover is due to firms' idiosyncratic shocks.
- **Turnover. Pure effect of Beliefs.** Beliefs of high uncertainty, reduce the response to demand shocks (generate inaction) and reduce turnover. [see last column].

[2]

• Aggregate adjustment costs. Two effects: (i) cost per firm; and (ii) change in the number of firms.

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Demand uncertainty & Market Structure

DEMAND SMOOTHING AND INDUSTRY COMPOSITION

	Unsmoothed Demand	Constant Demand	5 Years of Smoothing
Total Plants	3645	4264	5433
Fixed Costs			
(per Period in Millions of \$)	717	878	1109
Industry Composition			
Small Plants	54%	48%	49%
Medium Plants	23%	23%	24%
Big Plants	23%	29%	28%
Market Structure			
Markets With no Plants	5%	8%	1%
Markets With 1 Plant	43%	36%	25%
Market With 2 Plants	28%	24%	29%
Markets With More Than 2 Plants	25%	32%	46%

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Counterfactuals

Demand uncertainty & Market Structure

- **Number of plants:** Reducing demand uncertainty increases importantly the number of plants in markets.
- Size distribution. Small changes. A small increase in the share of large plants.
- This result is generated by the **level of irreversibility in the different investment decisions**.
- Sunk entry costs are very sizeable: reducing uncertainty has a large effect on entry.
 - The irreversibility of investments to grow (decline) in size are small.

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Demand uncertainty, Profits, and Welfare

WELFARE EFFECTS OF DEMAND-SMOOTHING POLICIES^a

Change in Net Present Value of	
Consumer Surplus	\$860 Million
Producer Surplus for Incumbents	–\$609 Million
Producer Surplus for Potential Entrants	–\$36 Billion

^aNumbers in this table refer to the difference in the net present value of surplus (using a 5% discount rate) between five years of smoothing and unsmoothed demand, averaged between 25 and 50 years after the policies were put into place, using 1976 as an initial state.

Counterfactuals

Demand uncertainty, Profits, and Welfare

- Reducing demand uncertainty increases the number of plants, reduces price, and has a positive effect of consumer surplus.
- The effect of uncertainty on firm value is ambiguous: it can be positive or negative, depending on whether the value function is concave or convex in demand.
- In this application, the value function turns out to be convex in demand such that reducing uncertainty reduces firms' value.

2. Time to Build and Fluctuations in Bulk Shipping

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Kalouptsidi (2014) - Outline

- 1. Motivation
- 2. Some features of the Bulk Shipping industry
- 3 Data
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Motivation

- In many industries, adjustment costs in capital investment take the form of **time to build**.
- Airlines or shipping firms face **lags of several years** between the order and the delivery of an aircraft / ship.
- Time to build, together with demand uncertainty, can generate inaction in investment as well as substantial deviations between optimal and actual capital stocks.
- Almost no micro empirical studies of the effects of time to build.

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Bulk Shipping vessels



Bulk Shipping vessels

- Designed to carry a homogeneous unpacked dry or liquid cargo; mostly raw materials, e.g. , iron, steel, coal, grain, sugar.
- The entire cargo usually belongs to one shipper [in contrast to Containers shipping vessels].
- Operate like taxis: no scheduled itineraries, but individual contracts.
- Shipping services are largely perceived as homogeneous.

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Some features of Bulk Shipping industry

- Entry occurs when shipowner buys a new ship from a shipyard.
- Building of new ships is characterized by significant construction lags.
- Because shipyards have binding capacity, the average **time to build varies over time**.
- : e.g., it increased linearly from 6 quarters in 2001 to 12 quarters in 2008.
- Exit occurs when shipowner scraps its ship.
- Volatility in shipping demand combined with the inelastic supply leads to volatile shipping prices

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Volatility in shipping prices

Bulk shipping freight rate index



Model

- Within the class of dynamic games that we have seen in class.
- A firm is a shipowner. The state variables are:
 - the age of the own ship: $k_{it} \in \{0, 1, ..., K\}$;

- the age distribution of all the ships: $\mathbf{s}_t \in \{s_t^0, s_t^1, ..., s_t^K\}$, where $s_t^k =$ number of ships with age k.

- the backlog of deliveries from shipyards: $\mathbf{b}_t \in \{b_t^1, b_t^2, ..., b_t^T\}$, where $b_t^q =$ number of ships to be delivered at period t + q.

- the aggregate demand of shipping services: d_t

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Model: State variables

- Within the class of dynamic games that we have seen in class.
- A firm is a shipowner. The state variables are:
 - the age of the own ship: $k_{it} \in \{0, 1, ..., K\}$;
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- the aggregate demand of shipping services: d_t

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Model: Profit function

- Flow profit (without entry or exit costs) of a ship age k: $\pi_k(\mathbf{s}_t, d_t)$.
- Scrap value: Private information: ϕ drawn from distribution F_{ϕ} .

• Entry cost: All potential entrants have the same entry cost: $\kappa(\mathbf{s}_t, \mathbf{b}_t, d_t)$.

• Time to build: All the new entrants at time t receive the same time to build: $T_t = T(\mathbf{s}_t, \mathbf{b}_t, d_t)$.

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Model: Firm behavior

- From a MPE of the model.
- Firms enter, age, and exit from the market.
- Entry cost: All potential entrants have the same entry cost: $\kappa(\mathbf{s}_t, \mathbf{b}_t, d_t)$.
- Time to build: All the new entrants at time t receive the same time to build: $T_t = T(\mathbf{s}_t, \mathbf{b}_t, d_t)$.

• World secondhand ship sale transactions. Date of transaction; name, age, and size of the ship sold; seller and buyer; price. [August 1998 to June 2010].

Data

• **Shipping voyage contracts**. Date of transaction; name and size of the ship; ship's price per trip. [January 2001 and June 2010]

• Quarterly time series for the orders of new ships (i.e., entrants), deliveries, demolitions (i.e., exitors), fleet, and total backlog.

• **Ship orderbook**. All ships under construction and delivery date. [2001 to 2010]

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New entrants



Exits



Incumbents

Handysize Fleet



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Estimation Approach

• The econometric approach in this paper contains an interesting methodological innovation.

• On the one hand, it applies two-step CCP methods to estimate some parameters of the model – nothing new here.

• Interestingly, it also uses data on tansaction prices of ships in the second hand market.

• Under the assumption that the transaction price represents the value of the ship, MK uses these data to avoid the computation of (some) present values..

• The assumptions are that: ships are homogeneous (per size and age); the second hand market is very liquid, with many agents; and almost zero transaction costs. Then, the **secondhand transaction price must equal the value of the ship**.

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Estimated Demand Function (Isoelastic)

	First stage, de	ep. variable Q_t	Second stage, dep. variable	
	Parameter	SE	Parameter	SE
const	2.01	(20)	-7.601	(23.8)
WIP	-5.05	(3.4)*	9.501	(4.51)**
agr raw mat P	1.291	(0.97)*	2.969	(1.32)**
mineral P	0.394	(0.57)	-1.658	(0.565)**
food P	-0.548	(0.715)	-0.346	(0.702)
China steel	0.365	(0.716)	1.534	(0.592)**
Handymax	-2.03	(2.12)	-4.705	(1.324)**
fleet	0.0013	(0.0014)		(0.597)
mean age fl	0.287	(0.150)**		
std age fl	0.5823	(0.335)**		
\widehat{Q}_t		. /	-0.162	

TABLE 5—INVERSE DEMAND CURVE FOR FREIGHT TRANSPORT: IV REGRESSION RESULTS

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Time to Build Estimates

TABLE 6—TIME TO BUILD REGRESSION ESTIMATES

Data

	Constant	S ¹	S^2	S^{3}	В	d
Parameters	2.536	-0.00082	-0.00063	0.00011	1.93e - 005	0.0303
Standard errors	(1.266)	(0.00058)	(0.00036)	(0.00036)	(8.3e - 005)	(0.019)

Notes: Standard errors based on 500 bootstrap samples. Coefficients joint significant at the 0.01 level.

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Entry and Exit Estimates

TABLE 8—ENTRY AND EXIT REGRESSION ESTIMATES

Data

	Constant	S^1	S^2	S^{3}	d
Entry					
Parameters	-8.425	-0.0024	-0.00045		0.934
Standard errors	(4.90)	(0.0025)	(0.00075)		(0.244)**
Exit					
Parameters	22.728	0.0073	0.00093	0.00104	-1.859
Standard errors	(4.89)**	(0.0016)**	(0.00092)	(0.0008)	(0.242)**

Victor Aguirregabiria ()

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Estimation of Scrap Value Distribution

Panel B. Scrap value density



Data

Million US dollars

Table 4—Comparison of Ratio of Constant to Endogenous Time to Build (CT/ET)

	CT/ET	NT/ET	
Fleet level	1.008	1.16	
Price level	0.999	0.97	
Entry level	1.016	1.165	
Fleet variance	1.44	2.06	
Price variance	0.98	0.86	
Entry variance	2.11	7.64	
Fleet and demand covariance	1.19	2.42	
Price and demand covariance	0.995	0.945	
Entry and demand covariance	1.19	1.763	

Notes: Average across 1,000 simulations and 320 quarters. First 50 quarters removed.

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